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The Power to Panic: The Animal Health Act 2002 
 
Executive contempt for Parliament is such common contemporary currency that one 
would hardly dare trouble the readers of this journal by seeking to bring another 
example of it to their attention. We nevertheless believe that the Animal Health Act 
2002 (2002 Act) displays an arrogance which will be found striking even by this case-
hardened readership.1 During the foot and mouth disease (F.M.D.) epidemic of 2001, 
the government engaged in ultra vires action on a huge scale, for it had no power to 
slaughter the majority of the 7 million2 animals it nevertheless did slaughter in the 
course of the “contiguous cull” which became the central plank of its disease control 
policy. 3 By passing the 2002 Act, the government has effectively acknowledged that 
this was so, for the Act seeks to make precisely that which was ultra vires in the past 
legal in the future, in complete disregard of the compelling reasons for the previous 
withholding of such powers. 
What is remarkable is that this contempt for legislative control of executive 
action is being shown for no good reason; the executive has no better an idea of what 
it will do with its extended powers than it had when it first exercised them in an ultra 
vires manner. The executive did not initially plan to carry out the contiguous cull in 
2001. It did so because its original policy for control of F.M.D. completely collapsed 
and the ultra vires action that constituted the cull was the executive’s panic response 
to that collapse. Only in the event of another such collapse would the extended 
slaughter powers of the 2002 Act be needed, for all the powers necessary for the 
rational and humane killing of animals were ava ilable under previous legislation. 4 By 
passing the 2002 Act, the executive, rather than review the flaws in its policy that 
produced ultra vires action on this huge scale, is avoiding any lessons to be learned5 
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by giving itself the power to repeat its mistakes. The assumption that legislation at 
least aspires to implement sensible policy does not apply to the 2002 Act. It is 
legislation which intentionally gives a power to panic. 
 
Slaughter during the 2001 F.M.D. epidemic 
The principal legislation establishing the regime for control of livestock diseases, 
including F.M.D., in force during the 2001 epidemic was The Animal Health Act 
1981 (the 1981 Act). Section 31 introduces Schedule 3 dealing with slaughter for 
disease control purposes. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3 provides: 
The Minister may, if he thinks, fit, in any case cause to be slaughtered 
(a) any animals affected with foot and mouth disease, or suspected of 
being so affected; and 
(b) any animals which are or have been in the same field, shed, or other 
place, or in the same herd or flock, or otherwise in contact with animals 
affected with foot and mouth disease, or which appears to the Minister to 
have been in any way exposed to the infection of foot and mouth disease. 
This provision did not authorise the contiguous cull carried out in 2001. We can 
be brief over the legal argument, for two reasons. First: this argument was 
convincingly made during the epidemic, nowhere more clearly than in a widely 
circulated opinion given by Stephen Tromans (on which we have drawn very 
heavily).6 Paragraph 3(1)(a) requires infection or reasonable suspicion of infection as 
grounds of slaughter and paragraph 3(1)(b) requires exposure to the disease, 
particularly but not exclusively by contact with infected animals7 or, through the 
concluding sweeping up clause, reasonable suspicion of exposure. The contiguous 
cull went far beyond this. In what became its typical form, it involved the slaughter of 
all animals within a 3 kilometre radius of a premises where livestock were suspected 
of being infected. That is to say, a circle with a radius of three kilometres having the 
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suspected premises at its centre was drawn on a map, and all premises within that 
mapped circle had their animals culled regardless of infection or suspicion of 
infection. 
This formal procedure, devised by a new, hastily convened scientific group with 
no relevant epidemiological, agricultural, or, indeed, regulatory experience, was the 
product of abstract mathematical modelling which took no heed of concrete 
information about the likelihood of transmission of the disease beyond the original 
suspicion of infection. The instances of suspicion were themselves generated by a 
process for identifying infection which was thought highly questionable at the time, 
due to the immense pressures on the State Veterinary Service; which has turned out to 
be wrong in between 30-40% of cases. In the end, of the over 7 million animals 
culled, perhaps 90% were uninfected, the result of what has been called “postcode 
slaughter”8 or “carnage by computer”.9 In fact, the word “contiguous” is a misleading 
description of the 3 kilometre cull that took place. In this context, “contiguity” implies 
(reasonable suspicion of) a chain of infection, and the cull proceeded in the absence of 
any such chain. The contiguous cull was a policy which abandoned slaughter on 
(reasonable suspicion of) infection for slaughter to create an enormous firewall or 
cordon sanitaire around any premises alleged to be infected.  
The second reason we can be brief with legal argument about the ultra vires 
nature of the cull is that the executive evidently has accepted it. In his capacity as 
Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Lord Whitty had 
responsibility for securing the passage of the 2002 Act; and it is true that in the course 
of debate he 10 was sufficiently unwise to tell Parliament that “the legality of the 
[contiguous cull] was never in question”. 11 But, as a matter of fact, the legality of the 
cull was not merely always questionable but was always questioned. Lord Whitty 
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himself admitted this in evidence he gave to the Lessons to be Learned Inquiry on the 
very same day he maintained the opposite in Parliament,12 and in his evidence to that 
Inquiry the Chief Veterinary Officer stated that from the outset the cull was feared not 
“likely to be legal”. 13 Lord Whitty also maintained in Parliament that “the operation 
of the cull was tested and upheld in the English and Scottish courts”. 14 We do not 
want to take up space in this journal by discussing the substance of his argument, 
which has been exposed as a gross misrepresentation inter alia in a widely circulated 
letter by Stephen Smith Q.C.15 It is enough here to note that Lord Whitty is referring 
to merely two (questionable) cases at first instance, one English16 and one Scots.17 So 
far as we are aware, M.A.F.F. brought only fourteen further cases to legally overcome 
occasions of resistance to the cull in England and Wales,18 withdrawing from eleven 
and losing two of the three it took into court, the last one being a serious reverse.19 
M.A.F.F. also withdrew from at least 200 other proceedings it had started, and it is 
manifest that it had so little confidence in its position under the 1981 Act that it was 
not prepared to test that position in the courts. What can one say of the mendacity that 
allows a Minister to say that this represents a policy’s being “tested and upheld in the 
English and Scottish courts”? 
The executive had to take very considerable pains to secure the passage of the 
2002 Act. Though unsurprisingly encountering no difficulty whatsoever in the 
Commons, the original Animal Health Bill20 was roundly denounced in the Lords and 
suffered a number of defeats there. The eventual passage of the legislation was the 
product of the executive’s strenuous use of its Commons majority. Enduring those 
pains was pointless if the contiguous cull was legal under the previous legislation, as 
was repeatedly pointed out in the Lords’ debate.21 But to one prepared to make the 
statements about the legality of the cull we have seen Lord Whitty made, 
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contradicting those statements must pose no difficulty whatsoever, and he did indeed 
introduce the 2002 Act as an attempt “to clarify - and extend - the powers relating to 
slaughter”22 given by the 1981 Act, and so “correct” “a major defect in the powers … 
available”23 by preventing “the spread of a disease, as distinct from dangerous 
contacts or exposure in the strict sense”. 24 The game was completely given away in 
the consultation document on the Bill issued by the Department of the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (D.E.F.R.A.): 
Part 1 of the Animal Health Bill provides new powers to slaughter 
wherever the Government considers this to be necessary to prevent the 
spread of F.M.D.. This differs from existing measure in that it provides for 
the possibility of culling animals in a wider range of circumstances than is 
at present possible … providing for slaughter on preventive grounds, 
rather than on the existing grounds of being affected with disease, 
suspicion of being so affected or in any way being exposed to the 
disease.25 
Having put the obscurity of Lord Whitty sufficiently to one side to allow us to at 
least initially see what the 2002 Act is about, let us now turn to the relevant 
provisions. 
 
Slaughter under the 2002 Act 
The relevant parts of the 2002 Act insert amending clauses into the 1981 Act in a 
slovenly way which handicaps the comprehension of both Acts and no doubt will 
itself cause tremendous trouble. Section 1 of the 2002 Act amends Schedule 3 para. 
3(1) of the 1981 Act by adding: 
(c) any animals the Secretary of State thinks should be slaughtered with a 
view to preventing the spread of foot and mouth disease. 
It is impossible to interpret this as anything other than a complete discretion to kill 
any animal the Secretary of State believes it necessary to kill in order to eradicate an 
outbreak of F.M.D. 26 To the concrete categories of animals set out in 1981 Act, sched. 
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3, para. 3(1)(a) and (b) is added a general category of any27 animals. It is surely the 
case tha t the new (c) reduces (a) and (b) to surplusage; their retention merely serving 
to give a quite illusory air of concreteness to the new, amazingly sweeping power.  
The specific reason why the executive has taken this power to itself is, of 
course, to allow it to cull more swiftly by removing the legal grounds on which 
slaughter was opposed in 2001, and therefore, to “minimise” the overall slaughter by 
speeding it up.28 Livestock owners who mounted opposition to the 2001 cull, and their 
legal representatives, were, in Lord Whitty’s view, behaving “very irresponsibly”,29 
and to an executive that believes its ultra vires exercise of power was wise, one can 
see why this might well appear to be the case. It does not apparently matter that the 
real reason that M.A.F.F. was unable to meet its slaughter targets is that these were 
(and will remain) impossibly impractical for other than a small (quickly contained) 
outbreak of the disease; or that, on the best information available, none of those who 
resisted the cull harboured infected animals.30 The real novelty in the 2002 Act comes 
in Part 3, which gives the executive very extensive powers indeed to enforce 
compliance with the now legal slaughter power, through procedures under which 
reasonable opportunities for livestock owners to present their case have been 
sacrificed to the perceived need for haste in slaughter.31 This has provoked very 
considerable criticism,32 and is obviously open to challenge under Article 6;33 but at 
least there is a clear fit between the effective absence of a hearing and the fact that, if 
the new slaughter power is good law, then there is nothing much to have a hearing 
about. The 2002 Act is not, to be sure, the best law. Despite the stated concern with 
proportionality in the consultation document 34 and, of course, the certificate of 
compatability accompanying the Act itself, the new slaughter power is also open to 
challenge under Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. 35 We do not want to add 
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to the discussion of this possibility directly,36 but we do want to try to explain why the 
executive has taken such pains to get itself into such a dreadful position. 
 
Panic and policy formulation 
To understand the concrete use to which this now legal slaughter power might ever be 
put, one must understand why the contiguous cull took place. It was, in the words of 
the D.E.F.R.A. Select Committee: “a response to a desperate situation, not a pre-
mediated response to a known, assessed risk.”37 Prior to the discovery that there had 
been an outbreak of F.M.D. in 2001 and for some time thereafter, nothing was further 
from M.A.F.F.’s mind than such a cull. M.A.F.F.’s F.M.D. policy had two main 
parts,38 one of which was indeed to “stamp out” an outbreak by culling and disposal 
of infected or at-risk animals; but these animals were to have been quickly identified 
and isolated, and so their numbers kept low and under control. The 1981 Act gives the 
powers to implement this policy, which is based on tracing the disease. M.A.F.F.’s 
contingency plan envisaged up to ten outbreaks. But so complete a failure was 
M.A.F.F.’s attempt to identify and isolate an outbreak that there were at least fifty and 
perhaps up to a hundred sites of infection before M.A.F.F. was even aware of what is 
now officially regarded as the first outbreak. In the time it took M.A.F.F. to realise 
what had happened and whilst it was wrongly insisting that the disease was under 
control, the disease had been spread so widely that in the end almost the entire 
country was infected or at-risk. 
The cull was a panic response to a situation of which M.A.F.F. had completely 
lost control. The extent to which the firewall cull was the result of what might 
properly be called a conscious decision remains a matter of extreme contention which 
the official inquiries have done little to quiet. To the extent that it was a conscious 
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decision, it was used because it was realised that actual tracing of the disease had 
become impossible. Four points illustrative of the ad hoc, panicked nature of what 
was done can be given. First: the decision to make the radius of the circle three 
kilometres was a fluke. Other radii were modelled and 1.5 kilometres in fact appeared 
to be the optimum (as generated by the highly questionable methodology). What, 
however, seems to have been decisive in the confused and panicked decision-making 
process was that the relevant E.U. provisions stipulate a protection zone of three 
kilometre radius be established round infected premises, within which animal 
movements be stopped, stock be placed under strict surveillance, vaccination be 
considered, etc. Such a protection zone is hardly an automatic culling zone, indeed it 
is the opposite, but in wide areas of the UK that is what it became. 
Second: the extreme haste with which killing within this zone was carried out 
followed from the adoption of a “24/48 hour slaughter” policy, by which animals on 
premises infected or suspected of being infected were to be killed within 24 hours and 
those in the remainder of the zone within 48. This was logistically impossible given 
the number of animals involved and the targets were not remotely met, but the 
extreme haste imposed by the attempt to meet them undoubtedly was one of the 
reasons the cull was so despicably cruel. This “policy” emanated from a 10 Downing 
Street lobby briefing. No justification was then given or has since emerged for this 
central plank of what passed for disease control policy. 
Third: the decision not to vaccinate animals even merely prior to slaughter in an 
attempt to gain more time to carry out the cull humanely39 was the product of an 
extremely heated “debate” during the epidemic. It is not merely that this debate was 
very largely based on misunderstandings of E.U. and W.T.O. biosecurity and trade 
policies maintained by certain special interest groups, notably the national leadership 
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of the National Farmers’ Union, accorded questionable privilege in policy-making; it 
is that it should not have taken place at all. The issue should have been settled earlier 
in any at all competent contingency planning; but it still remains completely 
unsettled.40 
Fourth, and perhaps the single most significant point, is that the cull was not 
administered by M.A.F.F. but by the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (C.O.B.R.)41 - the 
ad hoc committee which is convened to deal with national emergencies such as the 
possible terrorist threat immediately after 11 September 2001. C.O.B.R. meets in a 
reinforced subterranean bunker in which televisions monitor “sensitive” areas of 
London. The incredible state of affairs in which a regulatory problem of livestock 
rearing and farm economics, dealing with a disease which in almost all adult animals 
is no more serious than flu in humans, could be dealt with only by a government 
apparatus designed to deal with problems more akin to general insurrection has passed 
with nothing other than approving official comment. It did indeed prove to be the case 
that the combined forces of the apparatuses of the U.K. state, including its army, 
wielded by C.O.B.R. had a greater capacity to kill domesticated animals than F.M.D. 
to spread, once animal movement restrictions were in place, and D.E.F.R.A. has 
claimed this as a success.42 But, to state the obvious, if this was a success, one would 
not like to see a failure. If we may quote ourselves, the epidemic: 
caused an economic loss which D.E.F.R.A. estimates to be £9 billion. 
This figure is but a remote expression of the concrete losses, which 
include: the premature deaths of over 10 million animals, killed in ways 
which were almost always unacceptably, indeed criminally, inhumane and 
very often so horribly cruel as to be an occasion of lasting national shame; 
the loss of irreplaceable special breeds; the horror experienced by those 
with a scrap of humanity involved in the cull; the misery of thousands of 
small farmers and small businesspersons in areas related to farming and 
tourism whose incomes were drastically reduced, some of whom were 
driven into bankruptcy; the (continuing) pollution caused by the disposal; 
the frustration of the enjoyment of the countryside for a year. 
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It was a set of circumstances which M.A.F.F. did not understand then and 
D.E.F.R.A. does understand now that caused the epidemic and therefore the cull to 
stop when it did. The animal record and epidemiological information available to 
M.A.F.F. was so poor that the course of the epidemic or even the numbers of infected 
animals will never be known with reasonable accuracy. 43 As we therefore do not even 
know the real nature and extent of the epidemic,44 the role the cull played, even if it is 
properly assessed as a firebreak, is extremely unclear. Of course, if one kills all the 
animals, one stops the epidemic; but the point is to work out where the cost-effective 
point comes before this, and D.E.F.R.A. has no idea about this. But the 2002 Act 
purports to legitimate a power to cull which need not stop at 10 million animals. It is 
difficult to see how, in a future epidemic which did not stop when (or earlier than) the 
2001 epidemic did, D.E.F.R.A. will be able to avoid exceeding the 10 million figure, 
incurring and imposing even greater costs and, in particular, if stamping out without 
vaccination is used again, 45 repeating the horrible cruelty. 
 All sorts of revised contingency plans are being devised to make, inter alia, 
the stamping out of identified outbreaks of infection more effective. The executive 
clearly sees the general slaughter power it now enjoys as an important part of these 
plans. But it was a power exercised ultra vires as a response to the complete failure of 
contingency planning to identify infection, and it will only ever be used when this has 
happened again. Slaughter on reasonable suspicion was possible under the 1981 Act; 
the 2002 Act makes legal what a panic-stricken executive did in excess of the 
reasonable. There is, of course, no epidemiological practice that can guide a power to 
slaughter on this basis, for it is done, precisely, in the absence of reliable 
epidemiology; and so the executive will no more be able to exercise it sensibly now 
than it did when that exercise rightly was ultra vires. It did not emerge in the course 
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of the debate about the Bill how or when the executive will use the general slaughter 
power, and it simply was not possible that it could do so.46 Frank speaking here would 
require the executive to admit that its contingency plans for specific slaughter based 
on identification of the disease may not work, and that it is thereby taking a power to 
slaughter for reasons it cannot give at any level more precise than that they are “to 
prevent the spread of a disease”. 47 But, of course, frank speaking surely would mean 
that, even in this Parliament, this Act would never have been passed. 
 
Conclusion 
And, of course, it would have been better were it not passed. Had the Lords been able 
to defeat the Animal Health Bill, the Government would have been obliged to 
recognise the need for a complete re-examination of livestock rearing practices in 
order to bring the risk of F.M.D. within the parameters of realistic disease control 
policy. The excuse D.E.F.R.A. now gives for M.A.F.F.’s absolutely abysmal 
performance during the epidemic is that that epidemic was unforeseeable, being due 
to “a rare set of circumstances”. 48 There can be no doubt that M.A.F.F. did not foresee 
the outbreak, and that it was incapable of responding to the situation when it 
perceived what was happening. But M.A.F.F. had complete oversight of and 
responsibility for the animal health implications of the livestock rearing practices 
which caused the epidemic; practices over which, through subsidy under the Common 
Agricultural Policy, it has substantial financial control. Nevertheless, M.A.F.F. was 
disgracefully derelict in actually keeping track of the risk of F.M.D.,49 with the result 
that livestock rearing practices were adopted that turned an inevitable outbreak of 
F.M.D. into the epidemic of the disease in which by far and away the largest number 
of animals were slaughtered in world history. 
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In the light of what happened in 2001, one might have hoped that the newly 
constituted D.E.F.R.A. would now take some account of the inevitable limits to its 
regulatory capacity and the cost/benefit calculation that must underpin any rational 
(public) investment in disease control, and ensure that livestock rearing practices be 
framed within those limits. Most unfortunately, the review of farming the executive 
commissioned after the epidemic, and the large number of other inquiries into the 
future of agriculture, are having no real impact. But then, why might this be expected 
when D.E.F.R.A. signals business as usual? The most pernicious consequence of the 
2002 Act is that it gives the illusion of being able to control F.M.D. in the absence of 
any serious attempt to change livestock practices.  
By taking to itself the slaughter power under the 2002 Act, the executive has 
effectively said it is prepared to bear (and cause others to bear) what might as well be 
called the unlimited costs of dealing with a risk of F.M.D. which it is making no 
serious attempt to limit. But when one talks of bearing an unlimited risk, one is 
talking nonsense, and D.E.F.R.A. will find, when another epidemic occurs, that there 
are limits to what it can do. The 2002 Act is an astoundingly conceited refusal to 
discuss those limits, and, very sadly, they will again become evident only when, in 
another serious outbreak, D.E.F.R.A. again responds to them by (now legal) panic. 
Comforted by the illusion of infinite regulatory capacity fostered by its ability to pass 
legislation like the 2002 Act, the executive is paying little or no attention to the 
restructuring of the livestock industry that would make it unnecessary to panic. This is 
no merely formal mistake but, bearing in mind the horror of what happened in 2001, a 
simply shameful failure. Hayek saw executive contempt for the rule of law not only as 
deplorable in itself but as a bar to rational policy formulation. The passage of the 2002 
Act is very strong evidence indeed for his views. 
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F.M.D.). The consultation document says that the new slaughter power is restricted to 
susceptible animals (D.E.F.R.A., above n. 25, para. 15.), but, it is submitted, this is 
inconsistent with the definition of the new power. Non-susceptible animals (and, 
indeed, vehicles, clothing, etc.) can physically carry the F.M.D. virus though they 
cannot contract the disease, and, it is submitted, the amended Act now allows the 
slaughter of non-susceptible animals, probably within a legal (and practical) limit 
imposed by the preserved power under 1981 Act, s. 87(2) to extend by order the 
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definition of “animal” for disease control purposes to include any kind of mammal 
(except man) or four-footed beast which is not a mammal. 
It is farm cats, dogs, horses, etc. that are under particular threat from the 
vagaries of the definition of this term (D.E.F.R.A., above n. 25, para. 16), but the 
position of wild animals also is unclear. There are, of course, wild as well as 
domesticated cloven-footed animals, and the Minister had the power to kill 
susceptible wild animals under the 1981 Act, s. 21(2)(a). This power was consciously 
preserved in terms stressing its restriction to susceptible animals: D.E.F.R.A., above 
n. 25, annex A, para. 15. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the amended Act conveys 
the power to kill non-susceptible wild animals (subject to 1981 Act, s. 87 (2)). 
28 H.L. Deb., vol. 630, col. 837, January 14, 2002. 
29 ibid. 
30 S. Smith, ‘Letter to Ms. Mary Critchley, November 5, 2001’, para. 5 (available at 
www.warmwell.com). 
31 It goes without saying this is in contradiction of the anxious concern with certain 
“guiding principles” which would apply to all use of powers and which were said to 
be “Key Criteria” in the consultation document (above n. 25, paras. 6-9): “We will act 
openly and transparently making widely available the guiding principles that govern 
our approach… We will use powers in a way that is proportionate … We have an 
underlying commitment to minimise the overall number of animals that need to be 
slaughtered by using the powers in a timely and targeted way and by taking 
appropriate preventative action where this is justified. The Government will be fully 
accountable for its use of the slaughter powers… We will seek to consult wherever 
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time permits, including with the relevant local interests, before taking a decision to 
exercise the slaughter powers” (emphases in the original). 
32 Baroness Mallalieu, H.L. Deb., vol. 630, col. 891, January 14, 2002: “The [Animal 
Health] Bill …gives virtually unlimited powers, providing D.E.F.R.A. officials with, 
in effect, carte blanche to order slaughter without any requirement that they publicly 
justify, explain, give reasons [or] provide a fair hearing”.  
33 Above n. 30, paras. 13-20. 
34 Above n. 25, paras. 6-10. 
35 Above n. 30, paras. 11-31. 
36 We are, in fact, pessimistic. The new power is, in our opinion, not one whit more 
incompatible with the Convention than the purported exercise of the powers under the 
1981 Act was ultra vires and, indeed, Wednesbury irrational. The fundamental 
reasons the law did not and will not prevent the executive defying the rule of law are 
not, as it were, jurisprudential, and in the panic conditions in which the new power 
will ever be exercised, when it will be the case that F.M.D. will be argued to be out of 
control again, we do not expect human rights considerations to trump the executive’s 
cry of emergency. Rosalind English of One Crown Office Row writes of courts 
“bending over backwards to align themselves with the Government” and concludes 
that “the central legal arguments in domestic human rights and EC law will always be 
doomed to failure” (Persey v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs [2002] 3 W.L.R. 704, Lawtel Case Comment, March 21, 2002 (available at 
www.lawtel2002.com)).  
37 Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, The Impact of Foot and 
Mouth Disease, First Report (H.C. 323, 2002). 
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38 The other part is prevention by biosecurity, but even more than is always in the case 
with the management of a risk, complete prevention is impossible in the case of 
F.M.D., for no completely effective prophylactic vaccination is available at the 
moment and, in its absence, the disease is so contagious that outbreaks are inevitable. 
39 There are other possible uses of vaccination which, seeking to confine ourselves to 
discussion of the basic rationality rather than desirability of a policy of culling, we 
will not discuss. 
40 The 1981 Act, s. 14B (inserted by the 2002 Act, s. 15) places D.E.F.R.A. under a 
duty to consider whether vaccination “is more appropriate than any other means of 
treating the disease”. This anodyne duty, which leaves D.E.F.R.A. perfectly free not 
to vaccinate at all, is a very considerable watering down of a Lords’ attempt to give 
vaccination much greater priority in the treatment of any future outbreak conceded 
only to get the legislation through: H.L. Deb., vol. 640, cols. 873-917, November 7, 
2002. At a time when the E.U. has concluded that the stamp out policy “cannot 
continue in its present form” (European Parliament, Report of the Temporary 
Committee on Foot and Mouth Disease etc., November 28, 2002, para.11) and is in 
the process of revising disease control policy accordingly (European Commission, 
Final Proposal for a Council Directive on Community Measure for the Control of 
Foot and Mouth Disease etc. (2002)), and when the Secretary of State is making 
public statements of her intention to vaccinate (P. Hetherington, ‘Beckett Vows to 
Vaccinate in any Future Foot and Mouth Outbreak’, Guardian, November 7, 2002), 
this effective defence of the power not to vaccinate leaves the law of disease control 
in a bewildering state. There is the most pressing need to sort out a policy over this, 
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and the passage of the 2002 Act before this has been done is a specific example of the 
deplorable nature of this legislation.  
41 C.O.B.R. is also known by the acronym C.O.B.R.A. as the room in question is 
Briefing Room A. 
42 D.E.F.R.A., Autumn Performance Report 2002 (Cm 5698, 2002) p. 2. 
43 Recent litigation has shown that even the number, age and source of the animals 
burnt in pyres is shrouded in mystery: Feakins v. Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs [2002] EWHC 2574. 
44 For this reason, the Countess of Mar may well have been right to doubt whether the 
2001 epidemic was, as is widely claimed, the largest outbreak the world has ever 
seen. Nevertheless, she was equally right to insist that it certainly “was the one in 
which most animals were killed” (H.L. Deb., vol. 630, col. 911, January 14, 2002). 
45 As the 2002 Act allows: see n. 40 above. 
46 The consultation paper (n. 25 above, paras. 11-16) did list 4 four “situations when 
culls may be requited to prevent the spread of the disease”: airborne spread, 
waterborne spread, spread by wild animals and the creation of a firebreak. The first 
three would come under the 1981 Act’s powers if they could be shown to ground a 
reasonable suspicion of infection (discussion of this in relationship to airborne spread 
was at the heart of the Westerhall case, above n. 17), and so they do not relate to what 
is novel in the 2002 Act. Only the firebreak relates to this, and nothing is said about 
when and how it will be used, because nothing could be said.  
47 Above, n. 14. 
48 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Statement on Foot and 
Mouth Inquiries’ (D.E.F.R.A., July 22, 2002). 
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49 As, it must be said, was the livestock industry. Under the 1981 Act, disease control 
was essentially made the responsibility of M.A.F.F., and it evidently was the case 
that, by treating disease control as a public good in this way, M.A.F.F. la rgely made it 
external to the cost calculations of the livestock industry. That industry consequently 
adopted extremely hazardous practices, particularly a system of mass live animal 
movements which really would not be much different if it was intended to spread the 
disease, and gave a low priority to biosecurity, and these were the conditions that 
turned an inevitable outbreak of this extremely contagious disease into the most costly 
epidemic ever known. 
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